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Practitioner’s Abstract:  
Controlling a variety of feeder cattle characteristics, and market and sale conditions, we 
estimate that certified vaccinations claims along with at least 30 days weaning claims bring in a 
premium of $6.13/cwt, which is nearly two times of that for similar uncertified claims, compared 
to no vaccinations and weaning claims at all in Iowa feeder cattle auctions. This indicates that 
the third party certification is supported in the market as a tool to signal quality in terms of 
vaccinations and weaning claims towards preconditioning.   
 
 




U.S. beef industry is striving to meet higher and consistent quality demands of consumers in 
domestic and foreign markets amid health concerns such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE) and foot and mouth diseases, and intense competition from other animal protein sources. 
As discussions and efforts continue towards establishing a national ID system, whether the 
effective and efficient transmission of information on quality attributes in a segmented chain 
structure such as beef industry can be coordinated by market incentives and mechanisms remains 
as the main issue. In that regard, a critical point in beef supply chain is feeder cattle auctions 
where the bulk of cattle are transferred from ranchers to feeders (possibly backgrounders and 
stockers in between), and yet these transactions can be subject to information asymmetry 
problem (Chymis, et al., 2004 and Hueth and Lawrence, 2002). When buyers buy cattle in feeder 
auctions, they are typically uncertain about the heterogeneous characteristics of the cattle. The 
traits valued by consumers can be learned at much later stages in production such as slaughter or 
even at the consumption stage. Even though there can be objective means of measuring the 
quality of cattle, the measurement cost prohibits such efforts as transactions at auctions are done 
very quickly at a large volume. Feedlots typically hire order buyers, who are experienced in 
visually assessing cattle but this of course has limitations.  
 
 
In such a situation, sellers have incentive to step in and bear the cost of acquiring information by 
making some degree of information available from transactions costs economics perspective. 
Chvosta, et al., (2001) studied such information provisions at bull auctions. Sellers also need to 
signal quality to prevent Type 1 (rejecting high quality cattle) and Type 2 (accepting low quality 
cattle) errors on the side of buyers. However, sellers have incentive to overstate the condition of 
their animals, or not to state any unfavorable information at all, which may be related to 
vaccinations, treatment, nutrition history, weaning status, etc. And, yet the performance of cattle 
in feedlot and the quality of their meat at slaughter are associated with this sort of information 
(Busby, et al., 2004, and Faber, et al., 1999). Reputation concerns of sellers may not be of 
enough discipline in feeder auction environment, where the majority of producers are selling a 
small number of cattle once or twice a year. Moreover, reselling based on speculative motives is 
not uncommon, and buyers and sellers are not negotiating one-to-one as in contract 
environments. Alternatively, sellers can make their claims more credible via third party 
certification, which can include the official state-sanctioned green or gold tag vaccination and/or 
    1preconditioning programs (where all vaccinations are done by a veterinarian, and documented) 




Although the third party verification programs have potential to mitigate the asymmetric 
information problem, there are potential issues as well. In essence, the asymmetric information 
problem is not actually solved but shifted from sellers to third party agents. Then, the issue 
becomes the reputation of these programs rather than the reputation of sellers. Buyers should 
trust the integrity of programs and procedures. There are multiple protocols and procedures, 
which are not equally monitored and controlled. As these programs are costly and possibly 
valued by buyers, some producers can simply imitate the third party programs by doing the 
vaccinations themselves, and make vaccination claims that are identical to the third party 
programs. It is known that feedlots routinely revaccinate the cattle they receive partly due to lack 
of trust in vaccinations claims or the commingling of cattle of with multiple protocols from 
various regions (Chymis, et al., 2004). Also, the cattle certified by a third party should be offered 
at enough volume to be of some value to buyers.  
 
 
The value of preconditioning programs in terms of price premiums created is reported in the 
literature (Ward and Lalman, 2003, Avent, Ward and Lalman, 2004, King, 2004, Corah, et al, 
2006).  But none of these studies have explicitly focused on the value to the source of the claims 
made in terms of third party versus sellers themselves.  In this paper, we study the perceived 
value of the third party certification of claims on vaccinations along with weaning vis-à-vis 
similar uncertified claims, and ultimately aim to provide insights to the asymmetric information 




Data was collected by four recorders hired by Iowa Beef Center at Iowa State University from 
105 sales that took place in nine sale barns located on mostly Southern, South-Western, and 
Western Iowa over the time period from October 20, 2005 to February 24, 2006. The survey 
                                                 
2 In Iowa green tag program, calves must be vaccinated for IBR, BVD, BRSV, PI-3, 7-Way 
Clostridia, Haemophilus somnus, treated for internal and external parasites, castrated and 
dehorned, if necessary. They can be further vaccinated for Mannheima (formerly Pasteurella) 
and other diseases and/or implanted with growth promotant but these are optional. All 
vaccinations and health procedures must be done by a veterinarian. For gold tag level, calves 
must be revaccinated two weeks or later after the first round of vaccinations. Once these are 
done, green or gold tag are placed in the upper part of left ear of calf by the veterinarian. Calves 
can be sold as green or gold tagged but they are not considered as preconditioned yet, and are not 
supposed to be represented as such. To obtain preconditioning certificate, calves must be weaned 
at least thirty or forty-five days for green and gold tag programs, respectively. In the certificate, 
additional information on weaning ration, breed type, and source (home raised or not), etc., can 
be provided but this is optional. More information about the preconditioning program can be 
found at the website http://www.iowavma.org.    
 
    2included detailed items that are relevant to price formation and our recorders worked with USDA 
market reporters that were present in the sales. There were 20 preconditioned, 5 featured sales, 
and the rest were regular “special” sales. After excluding the extreme and/or problematic lots, 
which accounted for nearly 2% of the data originally entered, we could incorporate 20,066 lots 
of cattle sold in this analysis. In addition, daily live cattle futures prices were obtained from 
Livestock Marketing Information Center. Daily corn prices were obtained from Iowa State 




We postulate that buyers are interested in the uncertainty over quality (the potential for quality 
grade, yield grade, feedlot performance, health and overall condition) of animal. Buyers form 
their beliefs on these performance measures based on some associated signals (captured by the 
explanatory variables considered here) they receive. To an extent that these signals have impact 
on buyers’ expected profit, they are reflected in their bidding behavior, and therefore, on the 
price that feeder cattle receive. For example, the amount of gain that an animal can put on each 
day depends on the genetic potential, sex and health condition of the animal.  
 
 
We model the price received by feeder cattle as a linear function of a set explanatory variables or 
characteristics. This type of modeling, called hedonic pricing models, is commonly used in the 
literature studying the valuation of feeder cattle (Dhuyvetter and Schroeder, 2000, Ward and 
Lalman, 2003, Avent, Ward and Lalman, 2004, King, 2004, Corah, et al, 2006). We adopt a 
rather simple structure here as in Avent, Ward and Lalman (2004) rather than interacting all 
variables with weight and weight squared as in Dhuyvetter and Schroeder (2000). The latter 
approach can make sense for some variables, and help fit performance too, but it makes the 
interpretation of coefficients difficult for reader.  
 
 
The hedonic pricing equation can be generically written as 
 
  
1 ... KK PXX 01 u β ββ =+ + + +         ( 1 )    
    
 
, where  stands for average lot price per hundred weight,  P i X  for  1,..., iK =  are the explanatory 
variables (characteristics),  and  i β  for  1,..., iK =  are the corresponding parameters, and  0 β  is the 
intercept parameter, finally uis the disturbance term to the equation. Note that including the 
intercept term, we consider thirty explanatory variables in equation (1) (that is, ). Below, 




Dependent variable: Price ( ):  The average lot price in our data set is around $120/cwt. The 




    3Explanatory Variables- Animal Specific:   
Weight and Weight Squared ( 1 X and  2 X ) are continuous variables. The previous literature 
consistently confirmed that price and weight have a negative relationship. The lower is weight, 
the more weight that animal can gain for the buyer. However, if weight is really low, it can be 
also indicator of health problems or poor nutrition in the past. The squared term is added to 
capture the curvature for which there is no a priori expectation. Weight of animal increases with 
preconditioning, which will decrease price per hundred weight. However, the net impact on total 
revenue is not known a priori. Furthermore, with preconditioning there is a chance of marketing 
cattle to upward trending market due to seasonal price trends. The average cattle in our data set 
weigh nearly 590 lbs from Table 1. A nearly 900 lbs weight range is covered in this study.    
 
 
Age: Yearling ( 3 X ) is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if cattle are yearlings, and 
zero if they are calves. Lots with calves are the base. The impact of age variable is not estimated 




Sex: Steer ( 4 X ) is a dummy variable which takes value of one if a lot consists of steers and zero 
otherwise.  Also, bull ( 5 X ) is dummy variable takes value of one if a lot consists bulls and zero 
otherwise. Lots with heifers are the base for both variables. We expect that steers and bulls have 
higher premium versus heifers, and this premium relatively higher for steers. The difference in 




Table 1: Data Summary: Part I 
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Min  Max  N
*
Price ($)  120.38  14.56  90  186  20,066 
Weight (lb)  589.51  131.79  305  1,265  20,066 
Lot Size (head)  8.41  12.12  1  229  20,066 
Sale size (head)  2,002.98  805.94  360  3,995  20,066 
Live Cattle Futures ($)  86.76  2.53  82  97  20,066 
Corn Cash Prices (cents)  166.23  14.51  143  187  20,066 
*N: Number of Observations 
 
 
Color: Black and black mixed ( 6 X ) is a dummy variable, which takes value of one if a lot 
includes black cattle and zero otherwise. Base is non-black lots. Black hair coat is an indicator 




Horns: Lots with cattle with horns ( 7 X ) is a dummy variable which takes value of 1 if there are 
cattle with horns in a lot and zero otherwise. Base is lots with cattle without horns. 
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Fleshy: Fleshy ( 8 X ) is a dummy variable which takes value of 1 if cattle are fleshy in a lot and 
zero otherwise. Lots without fleshy cattle are the base. No a priori expectation in terms of sign of 




Table 2: Data Summary: Part II 
Variables    Count  %* 
Yearling 879  4.4 
Steer 10,445  52.1 
Bull 606  3 
Black and Black Mix  13,802  68.8 
Certified Vaccinated and Weaned Calves  7,931  41.3 
Uncertified Vaccinated and Weaned 
Calves 
4,592 23.9 
Vaccinated but Not Weaned Calves  4,137  21.6 
Weaned but Not Vaccinated Calves  849  4.4 
Not Vaccinated and Not Weaned Calves  1,678  8.7 
* Percentages are out of 19,187 lots for calves-only-categories, otherwise, out of 20,066 lots.  
 
 
Health and Appearance:  Dummy variables, which take value of one if cattle have the 
corresponding condition, and zero otherwise. Lots with healthy and not dirty cattle are the base. 
Equation (1) includes 9 X ,  10 X and  11 X  for not healthy and dirty, not healthy and not dirty, and 
healthy but dirty cattle, respectively. Not healthy includes cattle that are sick and/or non-
conformant, such as rat-tail, lame, bad foot, bad eye, etc. Dirty cattle include dirty and muddy 
cattle and may be discounted because it may signal poor previous management practices and 
accommodations. We expect that the order of discount from highest to lowest should be for not 
healthy and dirty, not healthy and not dirty, healthy but dirty cattle with respect to the base. 
Preconditioned cattle is conditioned to have stronger immunization system and more likely to be 
healthy, and therefore, avoid these discounts.  
 
 
Explanatory Variables-Sale related:  
Lot Size: Dummy variables, which take value of one if the number of head in a lot lies within the 
given bounds, and zero otherwise. Base is lots with a single head,  12 X is for lots size more than 1 
but less than 5 head,  13 X  is for lot size at least 5 but less than 10 head,  14 X is for lot size at least 
10 head but less than 20 head,  15 X  is for lot size of at least 20 but less than 60 head,  16 X is for lot 
size of at least 60 head. We prefer the discrete formulation of this variable over the continuous 
one as used in the previous literature, and there is minor effect on the fit performance of the 
    5model per se. The cut-off points are obtained from the distribution of lot size, where 5 head is the 
median size, 10 head is close to 75
th percentile, 20 head is 90
th percentile, and 60 head is close to 
95
th percentile.  
 
 
Sale Size: Dummy variables, which take value of one if the size of a given sale lies within the 
corresponding bounds, and zero otherwise. Sale size with less than 1,500 head is the base. 
Denote the sale size of at least 1,500 but less than 2,500 head with 17 X , and the sale size of at 
least 2,500 head with 18 X . Although sale size variable is originally continuous (as we report in 
Table 1), we find the preceding discrete formulations as more readily informative to readers. The 
cut-off points were chosen around the 25
th and 75
th percentiles. This is to capture any sale size 
effect that may be present, which can make buyers more confident about the quality of cattle, 
and/or attract buyers with high willingness to pay for quality. Note also that sales where only 
preconditioned cattle sold are mostly large sales in our data set. 
 
 
Explanatory Variables for Market Conditions: Dhuyvetter and Schroeder (2000) found that 
fed cattle futures and corn futures (expected output and input costs to cattle feeding, 
respectively) are important factors for price-weight relationship (price-slides). Their study 
covered 46,081 lots over a 10 year period (1987-1996). We also considered these variables here:   
 
 
Live Cattle Futures: ( 19 X ) The fed cattle future price of the month at which cattle are expected 
to marketed.  We used the same rule in Dhuyvetter and Schroeder (2000) to determine the 
expected marketing month for cattle with different weights. For cattle weighing in 300-499, 500-
699, 700-899, 900-1199, more than 1200 lbs ranges, the fifth, fourth, third, second, and first 
distant contract were used, respectively.  
 
 
Corn prices: ( 20 X ) In Iowa, the main input of cattle feeding is corn, and we think that local cash 
prices (taken as Iowa average) are more relevant to farmers’ feeding decisions rather than the 
corn futures as in Dhuyvetter and Schroeder (2000). In particular, during the time of this study 
corn basis was at very wide levels. 
 
 
Monthly Time Dummy variables: They take value of one for the corresponding month, and zero 
otherwise. Base is October. Denote other monthly time dummies with  21 X ,  22 X ,  23 X , and  24 X  
for November, December January and February, respectively. These variables are mainly to 
capture seasonality but they may also reflect opportunity cost of labor, weather stress, and other 
non-price variables. We adopt rather simple structure here, which will yield average seasonality 
effect on all ages and all weights. It is known that from October to November, the biggest supply 
of non-weaned calves are brought to the market, which leads to lower prices compared to other 
months ceteris paribus. For example, prices for 400-500 lb steers were 3.7% and  5.9% higher on 
January, and February, respectively, whereas they were 4.9%,  3% , 2.4% lower on October, 
November, and December, respectively compared to the year average in Colorado over ten year 
period between 1991 to 2000 (Peel and Meyer, 2002).  
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Explanatory Variables for Vaccinations and Weaning Categories for Calves: Dummy 
variables, which take value of one if cattle belong to the corresponding vaccinations and weaning 
category, and zero otherwise. The base is not vaccinated and not weaned calves. Given their age, 
yearlings can be assumed to be preconditioned, therefore, no separate variable was considered 
for vaccinations and weaning claims for this age group.    
 
 
Certified Vaccinated and Weaned at least 30 days Calves ( 25 X ): The overwhelming majority of 
cattle in this category are vaccinated with respect to the green tag program (with their tags on) 
but it also includes private company programs, such as Merial 
® Surehealth
™, or gold tag 
programs. The weaning requirement to obtain preconditioning certificate in Iowa green tag 
program is at least 30 days, whereas in Merial 
® Surehealth
™ and Iowa gold tag program is at 
least 45 days.  
 
 
Uncertified Vaccinated and Weaned at least 30 day Calves ( 26 X ) In this category sellers made 
claims of vaccinations and at least 30 days weaning, which is considered here as competing 
claims to the preceding third-party claims. Vaccinations claims include variety of claims such as 
“green tag like” claims (including the green tag claim for calves without the tags on), a specific 
set of vaccinations, individual shots such as 7-way, or vaccinations claims without specifics, etc. 
The common denominator for these claims is that they are made by auctioneer on behalf of 
sellers and not certified by a third party agent. 
  
   
Vaccinated and Weaned Other Calves: ( 27 X ) Vaccinations claims may include certified or 
uncertified claims. In terms weaning claims, preconditioning requirements were not satisfied 
because either producers delivered the information that cattle were weaned less than 30 days or 
just made a weaning claim without specific weaning date or length of time. The overwhelming 
majority of weaning claims was in the latter category.  
 
 
Vaccinated but Not Weaned Calves: ( 28 X ) Vaccinations (certified or uncertified) claims were 
made but not weaning claim or buyers were provided information that calves were not weaned.  
 
 
Weaned but Not Vaccinated Calves: ( 29 X ) For these calves, weaning claim was made but either 




Estimations and Results:  
We estimated the model described in the previous section with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation procedure under standard assumptions. Given the size of sample here, the standard 
properties of OLS apply provided that the assumptions are correct (Wooldridge, 2002). We did 
    7the estimations in SAS econometric software by using the REG procedure. We report the 
estimation results under different tables although all of them are from the estimation of one 
model in equation (1). Note also that all coefficients represent price premiums in $/cwt unless 
otherwise noted.    
 
 
Table 3 summarizes some diagnostics about the estimation of the model. The number of 
observations is 20,066 lots. The fit measure of adjusted R-Square (
2 R ) equals 0.72, which is the 
same value reported in Avent, Ward and Lalman (2004). The variables weight and weight-
squared by themselves account for nearly 50% of the variation. The additional variables without 
interaction with weight and weight-squared can contribute only incrementally to the fit measure. 
Nevertheless, the fit performance of the model might be still improved by additional controls 
such as muscle and frame score, whether home raised, etc.  Because our data has time series 
component, we checked for the first-order serial correlation problem. We can not reject the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation (with p-value 0.26). White and Breusch-Pagan tests strongly 
rejected the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (with p-value less than 0.0001).  Note that 
Avent, Ward and Lalman (2004) reported the same problem. Based on the inspection of residuals 
and fitted values, this is due to some low weight cattle that are predicted to be higher valued than 
actually they are. Given the controls we have here, that is somewhat expected. Low weight in 
cattle can be indicator of potential to gain but also can signal for the previous health problems. 
The latter we have no way of knowing as analysts unless commented by reporters, which we 
incorporated as information is provided. Perhaps, including muscle and frame score can mitigate 
that to some extend. In terms of inference, the problem has almost no bearing because 
heteroskedasticty robust standard errors and usual standard errors very close. We used robust 
standard errors in our inference and tests.   
 
 
Table 3: Model Diagnostics 
Number of Observations Used = 20,066 lots 
Adjusted R-Square = 0.72 
Model is significant (p-value < 0.0001) 
No first order Serial Correlation problem (Durbin-Watson=1.5 with p-value=0.26) 
Minor Heteroskedasticity Problem (White and Breush-Pagan tests reject homoskedasticity 
hypothesis with p-value less than 0.0001) 
 
 
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates for intercept and animal specific variables. The 
estimates are consistent with the previous estimates such as Ward and Lalman (2003) and Avent, 
Ward and Lalman, (2004). Price and weight have a negative relationship, and this relationship is 
convex, that is, as weight increases price decreases but less and less. Yearlings have nearly $6.5 
premium over non-vaccinated and non-weaned calves, which is close to the premium that 
certified vaccinated and weaned at least 30 days calves have over non-vaccinated and non-
weaned calves from Table 7. Yearlings can be assumed as preconditioned per se. For the sex 
variable, both steers and bulls have premiums over heifers, which are $8.87 and $2.80, 
    8respectively. Note that nearly $6 relative premium steers have compared to bulls is the value of 
castration in the market, a preconditioning requirement. For breed effect, market values lots with 
black and black mixed cattle over lots over non-black cattle with $2.54 premium. Comparing this 
with the reported premiums for breed effects in the literature, Corah, et al (2006) had breed data 
recorded over five years 2001 to 2005 on 14,382 lots in Superior Livestock Auction. They found 
premium for black and black white faced lots $4.42 over Brahman influence cattle. Note that in  
 
 
Table 4: Parameter Estimates for Animal Specific Variables ($/cwt)* 
Intercept  $138.94 
Weight  -$0.19 
Weight Squared  $0.00008 
Yearling (Base: Calves)  $6.49 
Heifer  Base 
Steer  $8.87 
Bull  $2.80 
Black and Black Mixed (Base: Non Black)  $2.54 
Horns (Base: No Horns)  -$1.73 
Fleshy (Base: Not Fleshy)  -$2.38 
Not Healthy and Dirty  -$9.16 
Not Healthy and Not Dirty  -$6.45 
Healthy but Dirty   -$1.33 
Healthy and Not Dirty  Base 
*All significant with p-value < 0.0001. 
 
 
our study, the premium appears to be lower but this is due to the fact that our base choice is non-
black, which may include English and English crosses, English and Continental crosses, which 
had also premiums over Brahman influence cattle in Corah, et al (2006), too. For the variable 
regarding horns, lots including cattle with horns are discounted by $1.73, which shows the value 
the market places on dehorning requirement of preconditioning. Fleshy cattle are discounted in 
the market by $2.38, which may go against preconditioned cattle if they appear too fleshy. For 
health related variables; market discounts heavily lots including sick, non-conformant cattle, 
and/or dirty cattle compared to healthy and clean cattle at the amount of $9.16, $6.45, and $1.33 
for not healthy and dirty, not healthy and not dirty, and healthy but dirty cattle, respectively. 
Because preconditioned cattle will go through better health care and management practices, they 
are more likely to avoid these discounts.  
 
 
    9Our results show that sale related variables are economically and statistically significant in 
extracting value in cattle marketing. Table 5 summarizes the estimated coefficients for these 
variables. We found that buyers distrust lots with single cattle as a premium of $5.15 can be  
 
 
Table 5: Parameter Estimates for Sale Related Dummy Variables ($/cwt)* 
Lot Size = 1 head  Base 
Lot Size >= 1 but < 5 head  $5.15 
Lot Size >= 5 but < 10 head  $7.73 
Lot Size >= 10 but < 20 head  $9.45 
Lot Size >= 20 but < 60 head  $10.75 
Lot Size >= 60 head  $13.37 
Sale Size < 1,500 head  Base 
Sale Size >= 1,500 but < 2,500 head  $0.86 
Sale Size >= 2,500 head  $1.79 
*All significant with p-value < 0.0001.  
 
 
obtained simply by increasing the number of heads up to 5 heads. As the number of head 
increases more and more, the premium continues to increase but less and less. It picks up again 
when lot size increases to 60 and more, which partly captures the additional value from sales 
where only high number of sorted cattle can be sold. These premiums show that the sorting and 
pooling of cattle by sellers are valued in the market, and this is proportional to truck load size.  
There is also additional value in selling in a larger sale ceteris paribus. 
 
 
As in Dhuyvetter and Schroeder (2000), we also found that live cattle futures and corn prices as 
statistically significant variables in determining feeder cattle price but economic impacts are 
rather lower here (see Table 6). This could be due to the fact that these variables were not 
interacted with weight and weight squared here, therefore the estimated values have on average 
interpretation for all weights. Dhuyvetter and Schroeder (2000) showed that the lower cattle 
weigh, the more responsive they become to these variables, and we include much heavier cattle 
in our data set compared to their study. We find that a $1 increase in live cattle futures increases 
the price for cattle by $0.62. Also, a $0.01 increase in corn price would decrease the price for 
cattle by $0.04. For monthly time dummies, the observed trend in our estimations shows there is 
significant premium for waiting and marketing preconditioned calves in January and February 
compared to October. The reason that the price premium for December is not statistically 
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates for Variables for Market Conditions ($/cwt)* 
Live Cattle Futures  $0.62 
Corn Prices  -$0.04 
Monthly time dummy for October  Base 
Monthly time dummy for November  $1.24 
Monthly time dummy for December  $0.50 
Monthly time dummy for January  $3.34 
Monthly time dummy for February  $6.22 
*All Significant with p-value < 0.0001 except December dummy (p-value 0.16) and Corn prices 
(significant at 1%). 
 
 
Table 7 presents the parameter estimates for vaccinations and weaning categories, and the results 
of various tests regarding these coefficients. All parameter estimates are individually and 
therefore jointly significant (with p-value less than 0.0001). Implying that the vaccinations and 
weaning status categories are statistically important determinants of price. Calves without 
vaccination and weaning claims are being base,  calves with certified vaccination claims and 
weaned at least 30 days have premium of $6.13, whereas calves with uncertified vaccinations 
claims and at least 30 days weaned bring in $2.86. The relative premium between the two 
categories, which account nearly $3.27 is statistically significant (p-value of less than 0.0001). If 
calves were brought to market without 30 days weaning claim (either no date mentioned or 
mentioned that weaned less than 30 days) and vaccinations claim made, then they earn premium 
of $3.06 on average compared to the base. In fact, this premium is not statistically different than 
the one for uncertified vaccinations and at least 30 days weaning claim. In addition, calves with 
the vaccinations and weaning claims together bring in statistically higher premium compared to 
calves without claims on either or both components based on the corresponding tests in Table 7. 
Making vaccinations claim but not weaning claim or vice versa is not statistically different than 
from each  other (with p-value of 0.53). Finally, having a claim in either component bring in 
statistically higher premium (nearly $2) compared not claiming at all. In the following, we 
compare these findings to those of the previous literature. 
 
 
Avent, Ward, and Lalman (2004) provided evidence from three consecutive-day sales in 
Missouri in 2000. Relative to the regular sale, they found $3.30 premium in the single protocol 
preconditioning sale and $1.94 premium in the multiple protocols preconditioning sale. They 
considered the possibility that the lower premium in the latter was due to the multiplicity of 
protocols. They concluded that these premiums by themselves were not enough to cover 
marginal cost of preconditioning, and less than the perceived value of preconditioning by the 
surveyed feedlots managers (on average $5.25). On the other hand, Ward and Lalman (2003) 
estimated two models to determine the premiums paid for cattle enrolled in Oklahoma Quality  
 
    11Table 7: Parameter Estimates for Vaccinations and Weaning Categories ($/cwt) 
1-Certified Vaccinated and Weaned at least 30 days   $6.13 
2-Uncertified Vaccinated and Weaned at least 30 days  $2.86 
3-Vaccinated and Weaned Other  $3.06 
4-Vaccinated but Not Weaned  $1.99 
5-Weaned but Not Vaccinated   $1.77 
6-Not Vaccinated and Not Weaned  Base 
Tests on the Estimated Coefficients*: 
All individually significant with p-value < 0.0001 
Reject 1=2 with p-value <0.0001 
Do not Reject 2=3 with p-value 0.34 
Reject 2=4 with p-value <0.0001 
Reject 3=4 with p-value <0.0001 
Do not reject 4=5 with p-value 0.53 




Beef Network (OQBN) program (a preconditioning program along with third party verification) 
seven sales at 2001 and seven sales 2002. In one of the models, variables were treated as 
independent, whereas in the second model, they introduced a dummy variable combining various 
requirements of the preconditioning variable. This dummy variable took the value of one for lots 
which have the following features: “lots that have at least 10 cattle, polled, dehorned, healthy, 
uniform, managed under certain protocol and certified” and zero otherwise. The base was lots 
where at least one of these requirements was not satisfied. They reported a premium range of 
$2.28 to $11.58 for ten sales out of twelve sales in the second model, which they claimed to be 
typically higher and more consistent across sales compared to the premiums in the first model. 
Note that these premiums are for the total value of all these preconditioning requirements. In our 
study, premiums are decomposed into individual components of preconditioning.  
 
 
Other studies, such as King and Seeger (2004) and Corah, et al., (2006), reported higher 
premiums for preconditioned requirements. Both studies were based on the data from Superior 
Livestock Auction’s video auctions and have similar findings. Note that the variety of 
information on cattle can be made more readily available to buyers in video auctions compared 
to regular auctions. The more up-to-date one, Corah, et al (2006) covered 25,847 lots over the 
time period from 1995 to 2005. They compared different levels of vaccinations protocols, Vac 45 
(full vaccinations program including respiratory viral and clostridial diseases plus boosters and 
weaned 45 days before sale), Vac 34 (vaccinated for respiratory viral and clostridial diseases but 
not weaned) and NT (vaccinated only for clostridial diseases and not weaned). NT protocol is 
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premium for Vac 34 over NT was relatively lower as expected. Although we focus mostly on the 
source of claims, these findings are still consistent with ours.  
 
Conclusion: 
We have shown that certified vaccination and weaning (at least 30 days) claims bring in 
significantly (both in statistical and economic sense) higher premium vis-à-vis similar uncertified 
claims. This shows that the third party certification in preconditioning claims can be a tool to 
segment cattle with heterogeneous quality attributes in the market. It also shows that significant 
value can be lost if information is not delivered to the market even all work is really done, which 
refers to the pricing based on average quality. The estimated premiums for certified vaccinations 
and weaning claims are found to be higher compared to early studies but consistent with the most 
recent ones.  This may indicate that the reputation of these programs improved over time. We 
found strong complementarities between weaning and vaccinations claims in extracting premium 
in the market. We also found strong premiums for sorting and pooling cattle as captured by 
higher lot sizes. Combining the certified vaccinations and at least thirty days weaning claims 
with other preconditioning features, and selling as a large lot and in a large sale can bring in the 
best value. Finally, buyers value cheap effective visual signals (rat-tail, blue-eye, dirty, etc), 
which is consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis in feeder cattle auctions. The 
parameter estimates for other variables relevant to the price formation are consistent with the 
previous literature.  
 
 
For future work, we can include muscle and frame score, and whether cattle are home raised as 
additional controls. Given our interest in signals regarding the end-quality performance, muscle 
and frame scores are definitely relevant but how much heterogeneity exist in our data set 
regarding this variable remains to be seen. We will also look at the value of certified programs 
on other variables such as source verification, electronic ID, birth dates, and their interaction 
with preconditioning programs.  
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